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In recent years, terrorist actions have 
increased in Central Asia, especially 
in the two weakest states, Tajikistan 
and Kyrgyzstan, and on the Uzbek 
side of the Ferghana Valley. The 
killing of Osama bin Laden by US 
special forces has raised fears 
of a possible backlash from his 
supporters and a new wave of terror 
across a large area surrounding 
Afghanistan. Now the Taliban have 
warned Kazakhstan – Central Asia’s 
most successful economy and 
largest oil producer which has to 
date avoided the Islamist violence 
that has affected its Central Asian 
neighbours – of the dangers of 
entering the war on Afghanistan 
after the Kazakh parliament decided 
to send troops to join the NATO-led 
International Security Assistance 
Force (ISAF) war efforts. 
But it is not the death of bin Laden that 
will impact the dynamics of insecurity in 
the region. Terrorism in Central Asia is 
largely a localised, even if cross-border, 
phenomenon and Islamism has for long 
been firmly rooted in national issues. 
Most internationalised groups are linked 
to the Taliban, rather than to Al-Qaeda 
style international jihadism, and the 
future of most Central Asian terrorists 
greatly depends on that of Afghanistan. 
The Mujahedeen’s fight against 
the Soviet regime in the 1980s in 
Afghanistan severely influenced Islamic 
revival in Soviet Central Asia and the 
formation of the Islamic Rebirth Party 
in Tajikistan. In the 1990s, the civil war 
between Afghan factions contributed 
to structuring the divisions between 
the different actors of the Tajik civil 
war. At the beginning of the 2000s, the 
Uzbekistan Islamic Movement and the 
Islamic Jihad were both tightly linked 
with the Taliban in the tribal areas of 
Pakistan. More recently, the advances 
of the Pakistani army in Waziristan and 
in the Swat have destabilised Taliban 
sanctuaries and led to the “return” of 
Central Asian Islamists back to their 
homelands. The Kyrgyz National 
Security Service (SNB) estimates that 
there are around 400 Kyrgyz and 2,000 
Uzbeks among the Taliban.
In Tajikistan, the additional legacy 
of the civil war of the 1990s weights 
heavily. The regime’s inability to build 
political legitimacy in the regions 
which were most affected by the war 
and its strategies of marginalisation of 
the regional elites led to the revival of 
violent Islamic activism since 2009. For 
example, after having left Waziristan 
and Afghanistan, former warlord Mullah 
Abdullo – or at least people reclaiming 
themselves from him – re-established 
himself in the Rasht Valley, his former 
fiefdom, and has been held responsible 
for the attack in the town of Kamarob 
Gorge on 19 September 2010, in which 
26 Tajik soldiers were killed. 
However, not all Islamic movements 
are terrorist. The activist base of 
several Central Asian movements is 
motivated by questions of local social 
justice and of political resistance 
to the regimes of Islam Karimov in 
Uzbekistan, or of Emomali Rakhmon 
in Tajikistan. Many sympathisers are 
demanding no more than the right 
to practice Islam freely. The Hizb ut-
Tahrir, for instance, organises mainly 
underground religious education for 
young people and compensates for the 
absence of state welfare through its 
many charitable and social activities. 
It calls for the peaceful Islamisation of 
society, as do the proselytising groups 
that have flocked to the region, such 
as the Tablighi Jama’at from the Indian 
subcontinent and new brotherhoods 
such as the Suleymani from Turkey. 
Also found in this category are many 
Salafist groups, which denounce 
the secular nature of the Central 
Asian states, and conduct successful 
lobbying strategies within the Spiritual 
Boards and business communities.
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The Tajik authorities – as well as the 
Uzbek government – have toughened 
their approach toward religion over 
recent years. In the autumn of 2010, 
1,400 Tajik theology students who 
had gone to Egypt, Iran, Turkey, and 
Pakistan to study were repatriated. 
The majority of them are now refused 
employment as their foreign sojourn 
has made them suspects, which only 
serves to swell the ranks of clandestine 
imams. In February 2011, the security 
services further tightened their control 
over religious education and mosques. 
Women in particular are targeted 
and for a few years now have been 
prohibited from attending mosques. 
Arbitrary arrests and trumped up trials 
are also growing in number. 
Today, there is in Central Asia a general 
atmosphere of re-traditionalising cus-
toms, of valorising the daily practice of 
Islam, and of making family, political, 
and commercial practices more moral 
and Islamic. But valorising Islam is not 
linked to political Islamism: the part 
of the population that wants a more 
visible Islam and the Spiritual Boards 
– the administrative organs managing 
Islam inherited from the Soviet regime 
– call for a peaceful re-Islamisation of 
society, focusing on morality in social 
and family relations, social justice 
and the fight against corruption, often 
without a political agenda per se.
It is crucial not to confuse a return to faith, 
Islamism, and terrorism—amalgams 
on which all Central Asian regimes 
are used to build their legitimacy. Calls 
to Islamism are very diverse and not 
necessarily violent, and militants in 
the region are above all motivated by 
local social and political issues. An 
increasingly authoritarian management 
of religious freedom is unable to solve 
the region’s many problems, quite the 
contrary. In Uzbekistan and Tajikistan 
in particular, arbitrary measures taken 
in the name of the fight on terror against 
people practicing peaceful Islam only 
aggravate social tensions. 
The international community must 
not accept Central Asian authorities’ 
attempts to blame “religious extremists” 
for all of the region’s problems and the 
instability affecting their countries.  It 
is also necessary to point to the role 
of criminal groups, drug trafficking, 
poverty and many other social and 
economic issues. It is time for the 
international community to start paying 
attention to the social background 
of Islamism too, and not only its 
ideological side. The struggle against 
poverty and corruption must be at the 
core of international action. 
